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Prior Analytics and Aristotle’s commitment to logos
George Boger, Canisius College. 28 December 1996. APA Eastern Meeting, Atlanta, GA
1. Aristotle ’s commitment to logos. It is evident from the character of his extensive philosophical
writings that Aristotle was animated by a profound commitment to logos and to the centrality of reason
in human life. We can, first of all, recognize Aristotle’s commanding commitments to discovering truth
and to establishing knowledge, whether in the natural sciences, in metaphysics, or in ethics and politics.
While “all men by nature desire to know”, Aristotle is exemplary in aspiring to realize wisdom, to
possess genuine “knowledge of causes and first principles”. It is little wonder that St. Thomas was fond
of calling him “the philosopher”. Secondly, we see that Aristotle expressed his commitment to logos by
affirming the principle that nature in its diversity and human beings in their complexity are indeed
comprehensible. He writes in Metaphysics 1.2:
The acquisition of this knowledge [epistêmê] may rightly be regarded as not suited for man. ... God
may alone have this prerogative, and it is fitting that a man should seek only such knowledge as
becomes him [and not, as the poets say, arouse the gods’ jealousy]. But we should not believe in
divine jealousy; for it is proverbial that bards tell many lies, arid we ought to regard nothing more
worthy of honor than such knowledge. ... This science alone may be divine, and in a double sense:
for a science which God would most appropriately have is divine among the sciences; and one whose
object is divine, if such there be, is likewise divine. (982b28-983a7; emphasis added)
Perhaps Aristotle can be appreciated in this respect as sharing the Enlightenment’s spirit of daring to
know and its optimistic confidence in reason’s ability to establish objective knowledge. We can see,
furthermore, from the mission statement of the Analytics ‘to inquire about demonstration and about
demonstrative science’ (24al0-l 1), that Aristotle was committed to re-presenting the truth iritelligibly
and honestly. Posterior Analytics in particular is concerned with the organization and presentation of
the results of scientific study —each science is to be axiomatized in order to make its subject matter
intelligible and thus accessible. Aristotle remarks in Metaphysics 1.2 that ‘wisdom pertains to scientific
knowledge of that which is most intelligible, namely, of causes and first principles, since it is through
them that any given subject matter becomes intelligible’. From this we can understand his other remarks
there that “a sign of one who knows is his ability to teach” and that “a theoretical science of causes is the
most educative”. Again, in Nicomachean Ethics 6.3 he writes that “every science seems to be teachable,
and what is scientifically knowable is leamable” (1139b25-26). Apprehending the truth, then, the
philosopher in his commitment to logos also is educator.
In spite of his complaints about Socrates, it is nevertheless evident that Aristotle embraced Socrates’
teaching in the Phaedo (89d) that “there is no worse sin than mislogia” and in the Apology (38a) that
“the unexamined life is not worth living for mankind”. Aristotle, perhaps more than others, grasped the
importance of reason. The lessons in Nicomachean Ethics commit us to a life of reason as essential for
achieving happiness and for realizing our very humanity. Human virtue consists in making excellent the
soul’s deliberative and scientific faculties. Phronêsis “is a state grasping the truth, involving reason
[logos], concerned with action about what is good and bad for a human being” (NE 6.5: 1140b4-6).
Sophia “is understanding (nous) plus scientific knowledge (epistêmê) of the most honorable things” (NE
6.7: 1141al8-20). Happiness, the life of philosophy, is a realization of the divine element in human
nature. When we consider Aristotle’s bold statements in De Anima 3.5 and 3.7 that “actual knowledge
is identical with its object” (430al9-20; 43 lal-2), we can more fully appreciate his exhortation in NE
10.7 that reaffirms the spirit of his inquiry in Metaphysics 1.2: “We ought not to follow the proverbwriters to ‘think moral thoughts’ ... Rather, as far as we can, we ought to strive to be immortal and to go
to all lengths to live a life that expresses our supreme element” (1177b31-34). Prometheus stole for us
fire from the hearth of the Olympians; Aristotle secured for us a place at their table.
2. In John 1.1 we read that “in the beginning was the logos'’. Herakleitos reports that “the logos is
common” and that “all things happen according to the logos”. With Parmenides we might say that in the
beginning “whatever is, is”. The first philosophers recognized that the truth is out there and that it is
discoverable. Only later is there knowledge of the truth as the thinking subject puzzles about the object
world and comes to know the truths that ‘nature loves to hide’. On the way to knowledge, however,
there are many obstacles, dead ends, and false persuasions against which we must be instructed —the
path may seem ‘backward turning’ and ‘helplessness may guide the wandering thoughts of mortals’.
Too many misguided thinkers ‘confuse an apparent harmony for a better, unapparent harmony and

misapprehend the truth’. While the preplatonic philosophers were concerned with saving appearances
by discovering underlying realities, only the Academicians, perhaps, undertook real efforts to develop a
systematic method. Human beings, they early realized, need an instrument to help them separate what is
true from what is false and erroneous, what is knowledge from what is mere opinion. Humans require a
method to help eliminate error and to establish truth. Aristotle took up the torch and carried the project
through to its first completion. In Sophistical Refutations 34 (183b38-184a3) he remarks on his own
grand accomplishment in this respect: “earlier teachers of rhetoric and dialectic trained their students by
having them learn discourses by heart. Hence their teaching was rapid but unsystematic.... However*
we had no earlier work to refer to concerning a systematic account of syllogistic reasoning”.
Now, the philosopher tells us in Posterior Analytics A1 that all knowledge comes from previous
knowledge and generally in two ways: through epagôgê or induction and through sullogismos or
deduction. This suggests two aspects of human knowledge. On the one hand, there is the what that is
known concerning a given subject matter. The what has an ontic nature and pertains to the object world.
On the other hand, there is the how things are known; this pertains to the means or instrument for
processing information about a given subject matter. The how has an epistemic nature. The first is a
topic specific and contentful matter having to do with substances relating to a given universe of
discourse. The second is a topic neutral and formal matter having to do with method, that is, with the
çoncems of logic and deduction systems. We may now add an important corollary to Aristotle’s
commitments to logos: to establish a deduction system that serves to eliminate error and to establish
scientific knowledge. Prior Analytics fulfills this commitment.
However contemporary scholars may variously account for the ancient accomplishments, we can
nevertheless observe their keen interest to systematize knowledge. Notable in this respect are Euclid’s
Elements for geometry and Aristotle’s outlining in Prior and Posterior Analytics the requirements for
demonstrative science (apodeiktikê epistêmê). We may take these latter works as especially
representative of Aristotle’s commitments to logos and to humanity. Part of his genius is to have been
the father of formal logic, of having created the science of logic which is decidedly a metalogical
activity. The difference between logic and metalogic may be drawn as that between using an underlying
logic to process information about a given subject matter in a given object language, on the one hand,
and studying, on the other hand, an underlying logic, which consists in a language, a semantics, and a
deduction system. Logics themselves are the objects of metalogic or the science of logic just as animals
are the objects of zoology. In this connection, then, we take Prior Analytics to be a metalogical study of
the syllogistic deduction system, which, taken with Categories and De Interpretationen comprises
Aristotle’s treatment of an underlying logic.
3. A new interpretation o f Prior Analytics. Our interpretive standpoint takes Aristotle’s purpose in
writing Prior Analytics as providing a proof-theoretic discourse that verifies the results of his
consciously (1) constructing a natural deduction system for the purpose of deducing theorems from
principles and (2) demonstrating certain of that system’s properties. Aristotle realized a remarkable
metalogical sophistication in his service to truth and in his commitment to logos.
Three interpretive trends generally characterize studies of Aristotle’s logical investigations. The
traditionalist interpretation holds that Prior Analytics is a handbook for studying categorical arguments
or syllogisms. Proponents of this view such as J. N. Keynes, R. M. Eaton, and W. D. Ross usually treat
a sullogismos as a fully interpreted valid or invalid premise-conclusion argument12consisting in three
categorical sentences -- two and only two premises and one conclusion -- whose validity or invalidity is
ascertained by the familiar rules of the syllogism, namely, those of quality, quantity, and distribution.
The following are typical examples of (first figure) syllogisms from the traditionalist standpoint.
AN INVALID SYLLOGISM

A VALID SYLLOGISM

1.
2.
?

1.
2.
?

Every reptile is an animal.
Every turtle is a reptile.
Every turtle is an animal.

Every man is an animal.
No horse is a man.
Every horse is an animal.

An argument is a two part system, consisting in a set o f sentences in the role o f premises and a single sentence in the role
o f conclusion, and is either valid or invalid. The ‘?’ used in this paper indicates the conclusion o f an argument. Cf. J.
Corcoran 1989 on definitions o f logic terminology.
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The axiomaticist interpretation, originating in the 1920s and introducing the use of mathematical logic
to study Aristotle, takes Prior Analytics to lay out an axiomatized deductive system of theorems
analogous to Euclid’s Elements. J. Lukasiewicz, I. M. Bochenski, and G. Patzig take a sullogismos to be
a single, relatively uninterpreted, logically true conditional proposition —the antecedent conjoins two
categorical propositions, the consequent is a single categorical proposition. A sullogismos on this
account is a logical law and not an argument. Some sullogismoi are axioms and others are theorems
derived from those axioms according to a propositional logic used only implicitly by Aristotle. These
interpreters admit that Aristotle did not himself axipmatize his syllogistic system. The following are
examples of syllogisms according to axiomaticists.2
FIRST FIGURE

SECOND FIGURE

THIRD FIGURE

[(AaB) & (BaC)] 3 (AaC)

[(MaN) & (MeX)] 3 (NeX)

[(PaS) & (RaS)] 3 (PiR)

[(AeB) & (BaC)] 3 (AeC)

[(MaN) & (MoX)] 3 (NoX)

■[(PoS) & (RaS)] 3 (PoR)

The deductionist interpretation, perhaps prevailing since the early 1970s, also using the theoretical
apparatus of mathematical logic, argues that in Prior Analytics Aristotle was concerned with epistemics
and a natural deduction process. J. Corcoran, T. Smiley, and R. Smith consider a sullogismos to be a
deduction, that is, a fully interpreted argumentation23 having a cogent chain of reasoning in addition to
premises and conclusion. For deductionists, a sullogismos may consist in a premise-set of two or more
categorical propositions. They model Aristotle’s logic as a natural deduction system to make their case,
but they think that Aristotle could not himself have modeled his system because, they hold, he did not
distinguish logical syntax and semantics. The following is an example of a sullogismos, in particular, a
perfect or perfected sullogismos (J. Corcoran 1974: 109), according to deductionists.
1.

2.
3.
?

No reptile is a being having hair.
Every mammal is a being having hair.
Some mammal is an aquatic being.
Some aquatic being is not a reptile.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

No being having hair is a reptile.
Every mammal is a being having hair.
No mammal is a reptile.
Some aquatic being is a mammal.
Some aquatic being is not a reptile.

1
e-conversion
2
repetition
4,5 Celarent
/-conversion
3
6,7 Ferio

Still, notwithstanding these important differences, the three interpretations share remarkably similar
views on some matters central to Aristotle’s logic, notably (1) that concerning the nature of reduction in
his system and (2) that concerning his methods for establishing invalidity. Concerning reduction, the
different interpretations mistakenly conflate three processes that Aristotle explicitly distinguishes: (1)
the completion or perfection (teleiôsis or to teleiousthai) of sullogismoi atA4-6; (2) the reduction
{anagôgê or to anagein) of sullogismoi at A7 (A23); and (3) the analysis or resolution (analusis or to
analuein) of sullogismoi at A45. On the matter of invalidation, interpreters mistakenly take Aristotle (1)
to consider arguments or deductions and (2) to use the method of counterargument. However, Aristotle
neither treats arguments or deductions per se in Prior Analytics A4-6 nor anywhere explicitly uses the
method of counterargument. Rather, he principally uses what we designate the method o f counter
contrariety to invalidate premise-pair patterns and their corresponding argument patterns.
2

3

J. Lukasiewicz takes Aristotle’s letters ‘A ’, ‘B ’, ‘C’, ‘Μ’, ‘Ν ’, ‘X ’, ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘S’ to be non-logical variables for
which only universal terms may be substitùted (see J. Lukasiewicz 1958: 7-9; cf. G. Patzig 1968: 12-13). The ia \ ‘e ’,
7 ’, and ‘o ’ are our abbreviations for Aristotle’s logical constants (see below section 4 and n7). The ‘& ’ and ‘z>’ are
symbols (not Lukasiewicz’s notation) for familiar logical constants o f propositional logic. ,
An argumentation is a three part system consisting in a chain o f reasoning in addition to premises and conclusion and is
either cogent, in which case it is a deduction, or fallacious, in which case it is a fallacy.
An argument pattern is a two part system consisting in a set o f sentence patterns in a role analogous to the premise-set o f
an argument and a single sentence pattern in the analogous role o f conclusion. An argument is said to fit or to be an
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We hold that Aristotle constructed a deduction system and himself modeled this logic in order to
perfect the system and to determine certain of its mathematical properties. Accordingly, then, Aristotle
is seen at Prior Analytics A4-7 as exhaustively treating only and all possible combinations of premisepair patterns to demonstrate which pair patterns are concludent or generate sullogismoi and which pair
patterns are inconcludent or do not generate sullogismoi. In this connection, we hold, contrary to
previous beliefs, that a sullogismos as treated in A4-7 is neither a valid or invalid premise-conclusion
argument, nor a single, logically true conditional proposition, nor a deduction. Rather, as a relatively
uninteipreted object, it is an elemental argument pattern, in one of three figures, consisting in three
sentence patterns with places for three terms -- there are a premise-set of only two categorical sentence
patterns and a conclusion of a single categorical sentence pattern. The following are schematic
representations of the first figure or teleioi sullogismoi on our interpretation.5
BARBARA

1. AaB.
2. BaC.
/. AaC.

CELARENT

1. AeB.
2. BaC.
/. AeC.

DARII

FERIO

1. AaB
2. BiC
.*. AiC

1. AeB
2. BiC
.\ AoC

Moreover, a sullogismos is an argument pattern all of whose instances are valid arguments. Aristotle
recognized the epistemic efficacy of such elemental panvalid argument patterns and formulated them as
rules of deduction in corresponding sentences.6 His treatment of syllogistic logic is precisely analogous
to the activities of modem logicians and philosophers o f logic who, in their studies of propositional
logic, distinguish between the subject matter of a discourse and the formal or syntactic character of the
deduction system used to process information relating to the subject matter. Thus, for example, just as
‘modus ponens’ and ‘disjunctive syllogism’ name elemental panvalid argument patterns which serve as
familiar mies of deduction for propositional logic and are treated as syntactic objects, so ‘Barbara’ and
Celarent’ name mies for Aristotle’s syllogistic logic and are treated by him in a similar fashion.
4. Aristotle ’s natural deduction system. In Prior Analytics Â4-7 Aristotle establishes a set of deduction
rules as part of his natural deduction system. This system consists in four kinds of categorical sentence,
two pairs of contradictories and one pair of contraries, three conversion rules, four sullogismos mies, and
direct and indirect proofs. We outline the system as follows:
* There are four logical constants for the four kinds of categorical sentence:
to panti huparchein
to mêdeni huparchein
to tint huparchein
to me tini huparchein

belongs to every
belongs to none
belongs to some
belongs not to some

a
e
i
0

P belongs to every S
P belongs to no S
P belongs to some S
P belongs not to some S

PaS
PeS
PiS
PoS

instance o f a given argument pattern. An argument pattern is not properly valid or invalid. Rather, an argument pattern
with all valid instances is panvalid, that with all invalid instances is paninvalid, and that having instances o f both is
neutrovalid. A pattern is commonly represented schematically. See. J. Corcoran 1993.
Here the Ά \ ‘2?’, ‘C’ are Aristotle’s schematic letters; the ta \ V
and ‘o’ are our abbreviations o f Aristotle’s logical
constants. The ‘ .·. ’ indicates a categorical sentence pattern that has been established as following from a given premisepair pattern. See below section 4 on the use o f characters here and elsewhere in this paper.
Consider, for example, Aristotle’s treatment o f Barbara and Celarent -- the rule is stated at 25b32-35; the argument
patterns are represented schematically at 25b37-39 and 25b40-26a2 — and o f Darii and Ferio —the rule is stated at
26al7-20; the argument patterns are represented schematically at 26a23-25 and 26a25-27. Aristotle treats the second
and third figure sullogismoi in the same manner.

4

* There is a standard s y llo g is tic sy n ta x:78
First figure: PMS
Second figure: MPS
PxM,, MxS I PxS
MxP, MxS | PxS
major premise
1. PxM
minor premise
2. MxS
conclusion
Λ PxS
* There are three pairs of opposite sentences:
Two pairs of contradictories

1.MxP
2.MxS
PxS

Third figure: PSM
PxM, SxM \ PxS
1. PxM
2. SxM
PxS

One pair of contraries

PaS
& PoS
PaS& PeS
PeS
& PiS
* There are three conversion rules, two simple conversions, one per accidens conversion:
e-conversion

/-conversion

1. PeS
1. PiS
λ SeP
SiP
* There are four te le io i su llo g ism o l
Barbara
1. AaB
2. BaC
• AaC
^re are two

«-conversion per accidens
1. PaS
SiP

Celarent
1. AeB
2. BaC
Λ AeC

Darii

Ferio

1. AaB
2. BiC
AiC

1. AeB
2. BiC
Λ AoC

kinds of deduction :

Indirect deduction (Baroco: A 5 ,27a36-27bl)

Direct deduction (Camestres: AS, 27a9-14)
1.
2.
?

1.
2.
?

MaN
MeX
NeX

MaN
MoX
NoX

3. NaX
assume
4.
MaN
1
repetition
5. NaX
3
repetition
6.
MaX
4, 5 Barbara
7.
MoX & MaX 2, 6 conjunction X
8. NoX
3-7 reductio
Our discussion below works with this understanding of Aristotle’s treatment of an underlying logic.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

7

8

MeX
XeM
MaN
XeN
NeX

2
repetition
3
e-conversion
1
repetition
4, 5 Celarent
¿-conversion
6

Aristotle in Prior Analytics uses strictly a standard syllogistic syntax when he considers argument patterns relating to
given premise-pair patterns. Each such pattern consists in three different terms in combinations o f the four kinds o f
categorical sentence. He always understands the predicate term [P] o f the conclusion to be the major term in the
premise-pair pattern, the subject term [S] o f the conclusion to be the corresponding minor term. The term common in
the premises is the middle term [M] whose relationship to the other two terms is determinable in three figures, first,
second, and third: respectively, PMS, MPS, PSM. Using \P ’, 'S ’, and ‘A/’ as schematic letters (neither term variables nor
abbreviations for term constants), we can express the pattern o f every categorical sentence schematically as PxS' (where
‘jc ' ranges over Aristotle’s four logical constants). In the standard syllogistic syntax the conclusion always fits the
sentence pattern PxS and never its converse. In discussing Aristotle’s treatment o f premise-pair and argument patterns
we use the following schematic notation: in the expression, for example, ‘PaM, MaS \ PaS ’ the lPaM, MaS |’ signifies
the premise-pair pattern o f two categorical sentences separated by V (a comma) and distinguished as premises by T (a
vertical bar), which character is followed by a sentence pattern in the place o f a conclusion.
These four patterns are reduced to the two universal teleioi sullogismoi at A7. See below section 5.3.

5

5.0. Aristotle ’s metalogical study o f syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle had genuine proof-theoretic
interests to establish theorems about his system. At A4-6 Aristotle determines “how every sullogismos
is generated” (25b26-31). He exhaustively treats only and all possible combinations of premise-pair
patterns. He thereby determines which pair patterns generate a sullogismos and are panvalid with no
counter instances and, by a method using a principle of syllogistic contrariety, which pair patterns do not
generate a sullogismos and are paninvalid. (No pattern is neutroválid.) A sullogismos is treated
exclusively as having only three terms and two premises; this is emphatically stated at A25 (see esp.
41b36-37, 42a30-31, 32-33). Once having identified all the sullogismoi he proceeds in A7 to eliminate
redundancy and in A45 to establish their inter-relationships. Below we identify four metalogical
processes relating to Aristotle’s rules of deduction: completion, invalidation, reduction, and analysis.
5.1. Completion at A4-7. Each of the four first figure sullogismoi is teleios, perfect or complete: that is,
the necessity of the result following from the things initially taken is immediately evident, nothing
additional need be taken (Al, 24M8-24; A4, 26b28-33). Aristotle does not prove in A4 that certain
premise-pair patterns result in teleioi sullogismoi —they are just posited or understood as having a
logical consequence “di ’ hautôn” or through themselves. Each of the four second figure and the six
third figure sullogismoi is áteles, imperfect or incomplete. Their necessity is not immediately evident
but dunatos, that is, potentially evident. Thus, a deduction is required to make the necessity evident
(see: A l, 24b24-26; A5, 27al-3, 27al5-18, 28a4-7; A6, 28al5-17,29al4-16). In each case of a second
and a third figure sullogismos Aristotle shows by means o f a metalogical deduction that a given premisepair pattern generates a sullogismos (viz. an áteles sullogismos). At A5-6 Aristotle uses his natural
deduction system to demonstrate that a given second or third figure argument pattern is, in fact, a
sullogismos. The text concerning Camestres illustrates this.
If M belongs to every N but to no X, then neither will N belong to any X. For if M belongs to no X,
neither does X belong to any M; but M belonged to every N; therefore, X will belong to no N (for
the first figure has again been generated). And since the privative converts, neither will N belong to
any X. (27a9-14)
We can express exactly what Aristotle writes here in the manner of a deduction familiar to us.
1.
2.

MaN
MeX

?

NeX

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

MeX
XeM
MaN
XeN
NeX

2
3
1
4,5
6

repetition
e-conversion
repetition
Celarent
e-conversion

Aristotle obviously uses the first figure sullogismoi as rules of deduction in A5-6, and he explicitly
mentions their use there in the proofs of Cesare (27al2-13), Festino (27a36), Darapti (28a22), and
Ferison (28b34-35). Aristotle’s summary of A4-6 ntA7 highlights this point:
all the incomplete sullogismoi are completed by means of [teleiounthai dia] the first figure. For they
all come to a conclusion \perainontai] either probatively or through an impossibility, and in both
ways the first figure is generated. (29a30-36; cf. A 5 ,28a4-7 and A 6 ,29al4-16)
At A4-6 Aristotle establishes the preeminence of the first figure by positing the teleioi sullogismoi as
rules of deduction at A4 and by using them as such at A5-6. Thus, implicitly he eliminates the ateleis
sullogismoi as redundant rules of deduction for his deduction system. The verbs ‘teleiousthaV and
9

Aristotle’s syllogistic functions at two levels o f discourse, at the levels o f logic and o f metalogic. This has caused
considerable interpretive confusion (see, e.g., G. Patzig 1968: 145). In Prior Analytics he not only studies a deduction
system but he also uses that system metalogically to establish parts o f the system itself.

6

6epiteleisthaV (to be completed) are synonyms as used at A4-7; they denote a process using the teleioi
sullogismoi as rules.101
completion is a proof-theoretic process that establishes knowledge that a sentence fitting a
given sentence pattern results necessarily from two other sentences fitting given sentence patterns
by means of using the teleioi sullogismoi as rules of deduction. Completion here is a metalogical
deduction process whose epistemic import is to establish knowledge of panvalidity. This process does
not eliminate redundant rules of deduction; nor does it involve transforming a given argument pattern
into another argument pattern. Aristotle’s metalogic theorem concerning completion is that “all the
incomplete sullogismoi are completed by means of the first figure sullogismoi using probative and
reductio proofs” (A 7, 29a30-33).
5.2. Invalidation at A4-6. Aristotle uses the method of counter contrariety at A4-6 to demonstrate which
premise-pair patterns do not result in a sullogismos and are paninvalid. He writes:
However, if the first extreme follows all the middle and the middle belongs to none of the last, there
will not be a sullogismos of the extremes, for nothing necessarily results in virtue of these things
being so [ouden gar anankaion sumbainei to(i) tauta einai], (26a2-5; emphasis added)
This passage states a rule (a counterpart of those for the sullogismoi; see above n6) concerning the
premise-pair pattern ‘PaM, MeS |’, that no sentence is a logical consequence of two sentences in the
given pattern. He continues:
For it is possible [endechetai] for the first extreme to belong to all as well as to none of the last.
Consequently, neither a particular nor a universal conclusion results necessarily; and, since nothing
is necessary because of these, there will not be a sullogismos. Terms for belonging to every are
animal, man, horse; for belonging to none, animal, man, stone. (26a5-9; emphasis added)
Aristotle uses neither the method of counterargument nor the method of counterinterpretation, each of
which requires finding an instance of an argument having true premises and a false conclusion in the
same form as a given argument. Rather, by substituting terms for the schematic letters A, B, C
(implicit at 26a2-9), he constructs two arguments each of whose premises are true sentences and fitting
the same premise-pair pattern and whose conclusions also are true sentences, but in the one argument it
is an a sentence, in the other an e sentence. Aristotle cites two sets of three terms which he substitutes
into two argument patterns each with the same given premise-pair pattern. We can express what he says
here, with truth values given in parentheses, as follows:12
PaM, MeS | PaS

PaM, MeS \ PeS

2.

Animal
Man

a
e

man.
horse.

(T)
(T)

AaM
MeH

2.

Animal
Man

a
e

man.
stone.

(T)
(T)

AaM
MeS

?

Animal

a

horse.

(T)

AaH

?

Animal

e

stone.

(T)

AeS

1.

1.

We call such sentences, as given in the conclusions here, imperfect syllogistic contraries, in contrast to
perfect syllogistic contraries that pertain to concludent premise-pair patterns, since it is logically

10
11

While ‘teleiousthai' and ‘epiteleisthaC are synonyms, ‘perainesthai’’ (to bring to a conclusion), ‘deiknusthaV (to be
proved), and ‘sullogizesthai' (to be syllogized) are not synonymous with them, nor even with each other.
We distinguish form from pattern as follows. While every sentence or argument has only one form, a sentence or an
argument may fit more than one pattern. Thus, for example, the diversity o f arguments, each having just one form, may
all be said to fit the pattern “premise-set, conclusion” or, schematically ‘P-c’, where the ‘P’ holds the place for a
premise-set and the ‘c’ the place for a conclusion.
The argument patterns are given at the top using lP \ ‘A f, and ‘5” as schematic letters for non-logical terms. The ‘A ’,
‘Μ ’, Ή ’, and ‘S’ in the two given arguments are abbreviations for the non-logical constants. This way o f representing
the matter applies also to the table given in nl3.

7

13

possible for both sentences to be true. For Aristotle this demonstrates that “nothing results
necessarily” from sentences is this premise-pair pattern since, as he shows, the results “could be
otherwise”. Thus, any sentences of three terms fitting this premise-pair pattern are shown never to result
together in a valid argument -- there is no sullogismos of the extremes through the middle. This
premise-pair pattern is inconcludent. It is evident, moreover, that he treats at one time in this way the
four possible argument patterns in the standard syllogistic syntax for each premise-pair pattern. With
26a5-9 Aristotle establishes a practice that he uses throughout A4-6 to demonstrate inconcludence: he
selects terms to provide imperfect syllogistic contraries to show that nothing results necessarily from a
given premise-pair pattern. The expression ‘counter contrariety’ denotes this situation.14
THE method OF counter contrariety is a proof-theoretic process by which a given premisepair pattern is determined to be inconcludent and its corresponding argument patterns are
determined to be paninvalid. Accordingly, he demonstrates not the invalidity of arbitrary arguments
but (1) the inconcludence of premise-pair patterns and, consequently, (2) the paninvalidity of the four
argument patterns associated with each inconcludent pair in the standard syllogistic syntax. This method
eliminates certain argument patterns as possible rules of deduction.
5.3. Reduction at A7: Commentators have conflated15 Aristotle’s treatment of the reduction of
sullogismoi at A 7 with his treatment of their completion at A5-6 since in both cases he refers to the
process of completion. However, in A5-6 he shows which argument patterns are sullogismoi by proving
that a conclusion follows necessarily by performing deductions using all four teleioi sullogismoi, while
at A 7 he shows that the same argument patterns can be shown to be sullogismoi using only the two
universal teleioi sullogismoi. At Â7 Aristotle is decidedly concerned to demonstrate which patterns are
sullogismoi by using only the two universal teleioi sullogismoi as rules of deduction. Reduction is
portrayed here as a process from an áteles sullogismos to one of the two universal teleioi sullogismoi.
No sullogismos is reduced to a second or to a third figure sullogismos. By enumerating each possible
case Aristotle shows that only Barbara and Celarent are sullogismoi necessary for his deduction system.
reduction is a proof-theoretic process that eliminates redundancy and establishes the
independence of rules of deduction by showing that the same deductive results can be obtained
using only the two universal teleioi sullogismoi. At A7 Aristotle reaffirms that the second and third
figure sullogismoi are redundant as rules of deduction. By showing that the particular teleioi sullogismoi
(viz. Darii and Ferio) are not necessary, he also establishes the independence of the two universal teleioi
sullogismoi (viz. Barbara and Celarent) as among the rules of his deduction system. Reduction is not a
method of validating arguments or argument patterns, which was already accomplished at A5-6: it is not
a substitute for syllogistic deduction. Nor is it a process for deriving some sullogismoi from others to
form a deductive system: it is not a process for axiomatizing a system of logic. Nor is reduction
concerned with transforming arguments or argument patterns into one another. A 7 treats the
relationships among sullogismoi taken as rules. Aristotle’s theorem concerning reduction is that “all the
sullogismoi can be reduced to the two universal sullogismoi in the first figure” (A 7, 29b 1-2).
13

Syllogistic contraries consist in (1) two universal sentences -- the one an a sentence, the other an e sentence, (2) each
sentence having a different predicate or subject term respectively, and (3) each sentence relating the extremes o f two sets
o f three terms in two true sentences fitting a given premise-pair pattern. Such contraries are perfect when it is logically
impossible for both sentences to be true. The following example, relating to Barbara, illustrates this condition.

PaM, MaS \ PaS

14

15

PaM, MaS \ PeS

1.
2.

Animal
Mammal

a
a

mammal.
horse.

(T)
(T)

AaM
MeH

1.
2.

Plant
Tree

a
a

tree.
maple.

(T)
(T)

PaT
TeM

?

Animal

a

horse.

(T)

AaH

?

Plant

e

maple.

(F)

PeM

The method o f counter contrariety works for almost all premise-pair patterns, noticeably failing in some instances when
the minor premise is a particular sentence. In these cases Aristotle uses a modified method o f counter contrariety (see
e.g. 26b3-10) or a method o f deducing inconcludence from the indeterminate (see e.g. 26bl4-20).
See, for example, the following: J. Lukasiewicz 1958: 44; R. Smith 1989: 161; J. Corcoran 1981: 6; J. W. Miller 1938:
25; L. Rose 1968: 55; W. D. Ross 1949: 314-315; R. M. Eaton 1959: 86, 90, 122-124, 128-131; J. N. Keynes 1906: 318325; G. Patzig 1968: 134-137.
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5.4. Analysis at A45. Aristotle does not treat analysis at A45 in the same way as reduction at A7 or as
completion at A5-6 in terms of completing (teleiousthai) or bringing to a conclusion (perainesthai). He
has no concern with a deduction process here. Thus, there are no probative or reductio proofs in relation
to analysis as there are in relation to completion. Characteristically, Aristotle conceives of analysis as
one sullogismos being transformed into another; he even refers tô*the process of analysis as a metabasis
(5 la24-25). Analysis of sullogismoi can occur between any of the figures. Thus, no sullogismos, nor
any figure, has preeminence in this respect. There are two rules for analyzing a sullogismos in one
figure into another sullogismos in another figure. (1) Analysis is possible only if each sullogismos
proves the same problema —a, e, i, or o (50b5-8); thus, there is no analysis of Barbara, nor of Darii into
a second figure sullogismos. (2) Analysis is accomplished using only conversion and premise
transposition; thus, neither Baroco nor Bocardo can be analyzed. Aristotle treats the possible analysis of
almost every sullogismos and identifies which are not analyzable because the rules are inapplicable.
analysis is a proof-theoretic process that transforms one Sullogismos in any one figure into
another sullogismos of any other figure by means of using three conversion rules and premise
transposition. Analysis is not concerned with completion nor with eliminating redundant rules. Rather
Aristotle aims to promote his students’ facility with syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle’s theorem
concerning analysis is that “the sullogismoi in the different figures that prove the same problema are
analyzable into each other [except where per accidens conversion is used]” (see A45, 50b5-7).
6. Concluding remarks. Prior Analytics describes a natural deduction system as part of an underlying
logic. It is a proof-theoretic treatise concerned principally to establish and to perfect a deduction system
for science. Aristotle knew that deductions about matters pertaining to a given subject matter are
content specific and that they employ a topic neutral deduction system; such a system makes evident that
given sentences logically follow from other given sentences. One process of deduction is accomplished
through taking pairs of given categorical sentences to generate immediate inferences according to
prescribed rules, which categorical inferences are then added to the given sentences and then again taken
in pairs, to wit, syllogistically, until a final conclusion is obtained (see esp. A25). This process is treated
in Prior Analytics in an exactly analogous fashion as chaining immediate inferences by using rules of
propositional logic.
We can recognize Aristotle’s keen commitment to logos in respect to his project by what he writes in
Prior Analytics ASO about the capability of his syllogistic system.
For if nothing that truly belongs to the subjects has been left out of our collection of facts, then
concerning every fact, if a demonstration for it exists, we will be able to find that demonstration and
demonstrate it, while if it does not naturally have a demonstration, we will be able to make that
evident. (46a24-27)
This passage certainly suggests a modem concern with the completeness of a deduction system, that is,
with decidability and whether every logical consequence of a set of sentences is deducible using a given
set of deduction mies. Aristotle’s treatment of an ancient logic is strikingly modem respecting its focus
on the properties of a deduction system. Aristotle develops just this focus in relation to establishing a
formal deduction system in service to truth and apodeiktikê epistêmê. In Prior Analytics Aristotle turned
his attention specifically to the deductitín apparatus used to process information. Once he provided a
descriptive model of his system, he could study it and then establish theorems about that system’s mies
of deduction. Prior Analytics is a testament to Aristotle’s profound commitment to logos.
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